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Intractable Delay and the Need To Amend the
Petition Provisions of the FDCA
DIANA R. H. WINTERS*
Private party oversight has proven to be ineffective at countering inaction by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Inaction when regulation is warranted can
put the public at continued and increasing risk of harm, but the failure of private
enforcement to compel action reverberates beyond this harm to the interests of
individuals. It also diminishes the transparency of agency decision making, lessens
the opportunity for public participation, and reduces the interaction between the
institutions that oversee agencies. Moreover, the benefits afforded to the
administrative process by judicial review are weakened.
This Article analyzes two examples of FDA inertia and compares private
enforcement under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to more successful
private party activity under several environmental statutes. These comparisons
highlight several weak spots in the FDCA that contribute to the difficulties faced by
private party oversight in attempting to compel FDA action. The Article then
proposes solutions suggested by these problems. Congress should amend the Act to
include more specific petition provisions with statutory deadlines and to strengthen
the general citizen petition provision of the FDCA. Interested parties should also be
able to petition the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for the
review of the denial of rulemakings. These steps will restore the vitality of a critical
part of the administrative enforcement scheme—private party oversight—and
thereby benefit both the public health and the regulatory state.
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INTRODUCTION
Inaction by federal agencies in the realms of health, safety, and environmental
regulation causes as much or more harm than excessive action, or misdirected
action.1 A failure to regulate when regulation is warranted puts the public at
continued and increasing risk of harm. The administrative state relies on private
enforcement to remedy deficiencies in agency action, including the problem of
inaction. Agencies are also overseen by the executive branch and by Congress, but
private enforcement provides a critical check on the influence of political vicissitude
on an agency’s divergence from its statutory mandate.2 Moreover, congressional or
presidential action addressing agency inertia is unreliable.3
This Article is concerned with oversight of agency inaction and looks at why
mechanisms of private enforcement are ineffective under certain circumstances but
succeed under others. Agency inaction takes many forms, but the focus of this Article

1. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable
when human health or welfare are at stake . . . .”).
2. The Administrative Procedure Act, which prescribes the structure of agency
proceedings, emphasizes the oversight of private parties as the main constraint on agency
action or inaction. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 101 (2003) (The Administrative Procedure Act’s
basic provisions “rely on a single method for controlling the actions of administrative
agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”).
3. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 28 (2009).
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is not an agency’s failure to directly enforce its statutory mandates, over which it has
much discretion, or the failure of an agency to engage in nondiscretionary duties,
over which it has little. Instead I explore situations where an agency fails to respond
to a rulemaking petition or denies a rulemaking petition. In particular, I look at the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) activities. By “ineffective,” I do not mean
that the Agency has failed to act as a private entity desires, but rather that the Agency
has failed to engage with or respond to the issues raised. The situations addressed
here are evidence of a stalled system and a failure of the checks and balances built
into the administrative state.
More specifically, this Article analyzes the difficulty that private enforcement faces
in forcing action by FDA.4 Inaction by FDA—which has responsibility over eighty to
ninety percent of our food supply5 and authority over products that represent
twenty-five cents of every consumer dollar6—imperils the public and decreases public
confidence in our regulatory system more generally. In this Article, I look at two
high-profile incidences of FDA inaction—the failure of FDA to withdraw approval for
the subtherapeutic use of certain antibiotics in animal feed, and the Agency’s
recalcitrance in switching emergency contraception to over-the-counter (OTC) status
for all women. I will also examine two less prominent incidences of inaction.7
In both the high-profile and less prominent incidences, private parties petitioned
FDA to take a certain action, brought suit when FDA refused to do so, and in some
cases, prevailed in court with a judicial opinion admonishing FDA for contravening
its statutory mandate by not acting sooner. These cases can be seen as illustrations of
private enforcement working as it should—stakeholders mobilized to enforce a
federal agency’s tendency to stray from its statutory mandate and supported by
judicial decree. But even if this is a system working properly, it is not a system
working well.
The cases are striking because of the immense delay. Especially in areas of health
and safety regulation, FDA’s delay undermines regulatory goals and has a detrimental
effect on the public health.8 Moreover, FDA’s inaction in these cases is an example of
arbitrary decision making where “conclusions . . . do not follow logically from the
evidence,” and this kind of decision making affects statutorily provided rights.9

4. By “private enforcement,” I mean agency-forcing suits, or suits brought by private
entities against administrative agencies to force specific action. I am not addressing suits
brought under citizen suit provisions, although these are discussed infra Part I.A., nor do I
refer to suits brought under state tort law.
5. See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY
SYSTEM: A PRIMER 4 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22600.pdf
(basing this estimate on information supplied by the Government Accountability Office and
the Department of Agriculture).
6. RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 24 (2010).
7. I do not look here at cases brought to accelerate the new drug approval process. This
subset of agency inaction is governed by a distinct statutory scheme and is beyond the scope
of this Article.
8. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable
when human health and welfare are at stake . . . .”).
9. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
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In contrast, there are certain areas where private enforcement has been very effective
in forcing agencies to act pursuant to their statutory mandates. Private actors and judicial
review have spurred action under the Clean Air Act (CAA)10 and the Clean Water Act
(CWA),11 and have initiated the listing of many species under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).12 Although these suits have been subject to the delay inherent to judicial
review, they have nevertheless resulted in some spectacular successes.13
Why is oversight by private parties, one of the bedrock supports of the
administrative state, effective in some contexts but not in others? Although each
episode of inaction reflects a unique confluence of factors, specifically drawn citizen
petition provisions, as are found in some environmental laws, allow for meaningful
and (more) timely judicial review. In contrast, many citizen actions before FDA are
brought under a weak general citizen petition provision.
When it is clear that action should be taken, FDA delay undermines its statutorily
mandated goals. For instance, there has been a consensus for over three decades that
the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed harms the public health,14 and
FDA, as the agency with responsibility over animal feed, should regulate the use of
these medicines. Inaction and the failure of private enforcement also have
implications beyond their specific substantive context. Episodes of arbitrary decision
making resulting in inaction can, as Lisa Schultz Bressman writes, “affect individual
liberty in a collective sense.”15
Inaction is rarely documented, and the failure of private enforcement contributes
to the opacity of agency decision-making processes. Public participation in the
regulatory process is lessened, which is a detriment in itself,16 and reduced

Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1687 (2004) (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461, 496 (2002)).
10. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1764–72 (2011) (discussing serial litigation under the CAA).
11. See Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits To Enforce
Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353, 373 (2004) (discussing citizen suit
litigation under the CWA).
12. See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions
and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321 (2010)
(discussing success of citizen petitions under the ESA).
13. Private enforcement and judicial review do not always have a positive effect on the
regulatory environment. For criticism, see Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of
Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1331–36 (2014); Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at
323–24 (discussing criticism of citizen petitions).
14. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“For over thirty years, the Agency has been confronted with evidence of the human health
risks associated with the widespread subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals,
and, despite a statutory mandate to ensure the safety of animal drugs, the Agency has done
shockingly little to address these risks.”), rev’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014).
15. Bressman, supra note 9, at 1687.
16. See David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (“Proponents of
increases in transparency and citizen participation in environmental or other aspects of
governance internationally have invoked reasons similar to those offered by proponents of
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participation also permits agency capture by special interests or at least the
appearance thereof.17 Additionally, the failure of existing private enforcement
mechanisms means the regulatory process does not receive the benefits provided by
judicial review.
In addition, if the oversight function of private enforcement is not working
satisfactorily, the relationship between the agency and its various principals, which
is already complex,18 becomes even more tangled. Without the effective oversight of
the public and review by the judiciary, special-interest influence can thwart
congressional will or block executive priorities, administrative pressure can interfere
with legislative priorities, and/or legislative inertia can interfere with agency work to
protect the public health and safety.
This Article looks closely at these episodes of inaction by FDA and the failure of
private oversight in forcing Agency action. It then offers some solutions suggested
by the sources of the problem, although the complexity of the problem precludes a
simple answer. Part I presents a typology of mechanisms for bringing suit against
agencies to force action, and Part II looks at some specific instances of agency
inaction in both the food and drug and environmental contexts. Part III discusses the
problems resulting from the inadequacy of private enforcement to force agency
action in these circumstances, and Part IV puts forward some solutions, including a
call for Congress to write more specific standards for FDA to follow.
I. SUING AGENCIES TO FORCE ACTION
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) supports the architecture of the
regulatory state by prescribing general procedural mechanisms with which all
agencies must comply. Passed in 1946, one of the Act’s purposes was to “introduce
greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among
the diverse agencies.”19 In addition to the general provisions of the APA, agencies
must comply with their specific implementing statutes. For example, FDA must
follow the mandates of the FDCA but also ensure that its actions comply with the
APA’s prescriptions.
With regard to oversight by private parties, the APA permits citizens to petition
agencies for rulemaking and provides for the judicial review of agency action.20 The
FDCA also contains a general provision allowing private parties to petition the
Agency for rulemaking, as well as specific provisions allowing for petitions under
certain circumstances.21 This Part describes these rules, as well as an example of their

similar developments domestically, including increasing the fairness of the workings of
international regimes; improving the information available to international decision-makers;
enhancing prospects for compliance; and strengthening the legitimacy of the institutions
involved.”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1238 (1982) (describing the public values rationale for regulatory law).
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 39–41.
19. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012) (medical devices); id. § 360ss (radiation emissions); id.
§ 379r (OTC drugs); id. § 379s (cosmetics).
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counterpart in one of the major environmental statutes, the ESA, and explains how
these provisions define the contours of the private enforcement of agency action.
Next, it discusses the judicial review of agency inaction, which has a distinct and
convoluted history.
A. Provisions Permitting Citizens To Petition for Rulemaking
The APA’s provision on rulemaking provides that agencies must allow any
“interested person” the right to petition the agency for the “issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.”22 Agencies must provide “prompt notice” if they deny a petition,
and this denial must be “accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial”
unless the agency is “affirming a prior denial” or “the denial is self-explanatory.”23
The FDCA and various environmental statutes also contain petition provisions
providing for interested parties to petition FDA, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), or any other relevant agency to take particular action. For example,
a substance defined as a “food additive” can only be used in food after an interested
party has petitioned FDA to issue a regulation prescribing the conditions under which
the additive can be safely used.24
FDA has issued regulations prescribing the procedures by which citizen
petitions—petitions to the Agency requesting that the Agency take a certain action—
should be filed. For instance, any interested party can petition FDA to “establish,
amend, or repeal a regulation” that prohibits a certain substance from use in human
food.25 Any petitions submitted to FDA must comply with the requirements of the
petition provision, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, which also details procedures for FDA’s
response. Under this provision, FDA must respond to any petition within 180 days,
either denying the petition, approving the petition, or “[p]rovid[ing] a tentative
response, indicating why the agency has been unable to reach a decision on the
petition.”26 In issuing a ruling, FDA has much discretion and is instructed to take into
account “available agency resources” and “the priority assigned to the petition

22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). For examples of parties petitioning agencies for the repeal or
amendment of a final rule issued by the agency pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking,
see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2004); S. Hills Health
Sys. v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 1084, 1087 (3d Cir. 1988).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012). See Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, for a discussion of the
APA’s requirement that agencies respond promptly to citizen petitions. They point out that the
APA also requires an agency to “conclude a matter presented to it” within “a reasonable time,”
5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and allows courts to “compel agency action ‘unreasonably delayed,’” Biber
& Brosi, supra note 12, at 327 n.19 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)).
24. “Food additive” is defined as “any substance the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or
otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food,” but excludes pesticide chemicals, color
additives, animal drugs, dietary supplements, and foods generally recognized as safe. 21
U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). A petitioner must show that the food additive for which a regulation
is requested is safe. Id. § 348(b).
25. 21 C.F.R. § 189.1(c) (2013).
26. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2014).
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considering both the category of subject matter involved and the overall work of the
agency,” among other things.27
Many environmental laws contain specific petition provisions too.28 The Toxic
Substances Control Act allows “[a]ny person [to] petition the Administrator to
initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,” under various
sections of the Act.29 The ESA details the procedures by which interested persons
can petition the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce to add or
remove a species from the endangered species list or the threatened species list.30
Citizen petition provisions are different than citizen suit provisions, which many
environmental statutes also contain. Citizen suit provisions generally allow any
person or entity to sue a violator of the relevant statute or the agency in charge of the
statute for failing to perform a nondiscretionary action.31 The FDCA does not contain
a citizen suit provision or a private right of action.32 Without a citizen suit provision,
a party may be unable to sue another private party for violation of the statute at issue,
although a suit against the Agency is possible under the judicial review provisions of
the APA.
B. The Judicial Review of Agency Action
Under the APA, “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court [is] subject to judicial review,” and “[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”33 When
reviewing agency action, courts can “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed” or “set aside” agency action found to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” among
other things.34 In 1967, the Supreme Court stated a strong presumption in favor of

27. Id. § 10.30(e)(1).
28. Congress enacted many petition provisions during the 1970s. See Biber & Brosi,
supra note 12, at 327.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (2012).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2012). The ESA is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service.
31. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (“[A]ny citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf—(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be
in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (2012) (citizen suit provision of the CAA).
32. Private parties can only sue violators if there is a private right of action or a citizen
suit provision in the statute. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV.
93, 107–08 (2005). The FDCA does not contain a private right of action. See Bailey v.
Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012). The APA also contains exceptions to reviewability,
explained infra Part I.C. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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judicial review of agency action,35 and one commentator has noted that our society
has a “deeply ingrained commitment to the availability of judicial review as a check
on administrative action.”36
The APA’s judicial review provisions apply in the absence of a specific statutory
judicial review provision, which many statutes contain. Statutory judicial review
provisions may designate which level of court should hear the claim, specify whether
administrative exhaustion is necessary, or prescribe alternative methods of relief.37 Such
provisions may also contain standards of review that differ from those of the APA. For
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provides for judicial review
of standards issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and
it directs that “[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.”38
Other statutes contain judicial review provisions as well, although some of these
mirror the APA’s language. For example, the CAA provides that a court may reverse
an agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.”39 The FDCA “contains no single, overarching provision
governing judicial review. Instead, discrete agency actions are subject to specialized
review provisions,” which prescribe in which court (district or circuit court) appeals
from Agency action will be heard.40
C. The Judicial Review of Agency Inaction
As one commentator noted, “[f]rom a cursory reading of the APA’s statutory text,
it is not obvious that the APA would set a higher standard for judicial review of
agency inaction than for review of agency action.”41 Indeed, the definition of “agency
action” in the APA includes the “failure to act,”42 and the Act’s judicial review
provision allows courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed,”43 in addition to reviewing agency action. Action and inaction
are reviewed differently, however.
There are various types of agency inaction, and some are less susceptible to
judicial review than others. “The notion of agency inaction might encompass any

35. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967), partially abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
36. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 702 (1990). In The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, Bagley questions this
commitment. See Bagley, supra note 13.
37. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012) (provision of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act providing for judicial review in the “court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation
is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit”).
38. Id. § 655(f).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2012).
40. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Cutler v.
Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 887 (D.C.Cir.1987)).
41. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
43. Id. § 706(1).
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instance in which an agency fails to take desired or desirable action.”44 An agency
may choose not to prosecute an alleged violator, may deny a citizen petition to initiate
rulemaking,45 may fail to respond to a citizen petition calling for action,46 or may fail
to comply with a specific statutory mandate or deadline.47 Each of these decisions
not to act correlates differently with agency discretion and the extent of judicial
review. Courts see the former as almost entirely discretionary and thus presumptively
unreviewable, while the failure to respond to a mandate or meet a deadline is a failure
to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty, which is more susceptible to judicial review. The
courts treat each type of inaction along this spectrum with varying levels of
deference, and I address each below.
First, as noted, agency decisions not to prosecute specific violators or to take
enforcement action against specific parties are treated as presumptively
unreviewable.48 The APA contains two exceptions to the reviewability of agency
action which exclude agency action from judicial review if “(1) statutes preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”49 In
Heckler v. Chaney, a 1985 Supreme Court case involving a challenge by death row
inmates to FDA’s decision not to prohibit the use of certain drugs to administer the
death penalty, the Court held that section 701(a)(2) of the APA immunized “an
agency’s decision not to take enforcement action” from judicial review.50
In Heckler, the Court explained that such actions were unsuitable for judicial
review for several reasons, including the following:
First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation
or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the
particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to
undertake the action at all.51

44. Bressman, supra note 9, at 1664.
45. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as
moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
46. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(plaintiffs filed suit against FDA seeking to compel responses to citizen petitions filed years earlier).
47. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984) (citizen
suit brought against EPA for failing to promulgate waterway pollutant standards as required
by statute); Sierra Club v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 304 (D.D.C. 2012) (suit brought against
EPA for failing to meet statutory deadline to promulgate certain emissions standards).
48. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
50. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
51. Id. at 831.
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Although courts have construed section 701(a)(2) narrowly,52 agency decisions
not to take enforcement actions against violators remain unreviewable.53 On the other
hand, judicial review is generally available for agency noncompliance with
nondiscretionary duties. For example, the Food Safety and Modernization Act of
2010 set mandatory deadlines for FDA to accomplish certain responsibilities,
including promulgating several food safety regulations.54 FDA missed many of these
deadlines, and two consumer advocacy groups, the Center for Food Safety and the
Center for Environmental Health, sued FDA under section 702 of the APA to force
compliance.55 Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof,” and the APA’s
definition of “agency action,” includes the failure to act.56 Plaintiffs argued that FDA
had unreasonably delayed action by not promulgating the required regulations and
the court should therefore compel action.57
The district court agreed, explaining that courts can compel “discrete agency action”
under section 706(1) of the APA when it is “demanded by law.”58 FDA argued that the
reasonableness of its administrative timeline was the key factor in determining whether
there had been “unreasonable delay” under section 706(1), and that the court should
evaluate its timetable under the “TRAC test,” a six-factor balancing test set out by the
D.C. Circuit in 1984.59 The court, however, held that noncompliance with the

52. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1338–39 & n.23 (2008); see also Kenney v. Glickman, 96
F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision to inspect meat
and poultry products differently was not a presumptively unreviewable enforcement action
under Heckler); Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding that a
decision not to ban interstate sales of raw milk was not an enforcement decision committed to
agency discretion).
53. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (“Over the years, we have read
§ 701(a)(2) to preclude judicial review of certain categories of administrative decisions that
courts traditionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’ . . . In Heckler itself,
we held an agency’s decision not to institute enforcement proceedings to be presumptively
unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).” (citations omitted)); Bressman, supra note 9, at 1669.
54. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 350g(n)(1)(A) (2012) (“Not later than 18 months after January 4,
2011, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations—(A) to establish science-based minimum
standards for conducting a hazard analysis, documenting hazards, implementing preventive
controls, and documenting the implementation of the preventive controls under this section . . . .”).
55. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg,
954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. C 12-4529 PJH), available at http://
www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/2012-08-29-fsma-complaint-filed_78450.pdf.
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702 (2012).
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 55.
58. Ctr. for Food Safety, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
59. Id. at 969–70 & n.3 (“Under the TRAC test, the court should consider (1) whether the
time agencies take to make decisions is governed by a ‘rule of reason’ that governs the
analysis; (2) whether Congress provided a timetable in the statute; (3) whether the delays have
more or less of an impact on human health and welfare (as opposed to simply having an impact
in the area of economic regulation; (4) whether expediting agency action would have an effect
on agency actions of a higher or competing priority; (5) the nature and extent of the interests
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mandatory deadlines set by the statute required a finding of unreasonable delay and
granted declaratory relief.60 After the parties were unable to come to an agreed-upon
timetable, the court granted injunctive relief a few months later.61
In short, an agency’s noncompliance with a mandatory statutory duty is
reviewable and remediable.62 This is in marked contrast to the unreviewability of an
agency’s failure to take enforcement action. Between these two poles, however, is
the judicial review of an agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking.
In this situation, the agency is being urged to take action, and it refuses. For
example, in 2010, the Corn Refiners Association petitioned FDA “to authorize ‘corn
sugar’ as an alternate common or usual name for high fructose corn syrup.”63 FDA
denied the petition.64 And in 1999, nineteen organizations filed a rulemaking petition
with EPA requesting that EPA “regulate ‘greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.’”65 The denial of this petition was the
basis for Massachusetts v. EPA,66 a case with implications for both the regulation of
greenhouse gases and the judicial review of petitions for rulemaking.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court clarified that judicial review of the denial of
rulemaking petitions is permitted, but highly deferential to the agency’s decision,
explaining that “[t]here are key differences between a denial of a petition for
rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action” and that
“[r]efusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such
review is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential.’”67
Although a court’s review of an agency’s decision on a rulemaking petition is
highly deferential, its ability to assess the appropriateness of that decision is
modulated by the statutory requirements of the provision under which the petition
was made. Specific requirements create tangible markers to assess whether the
agency has adhered to its duty. For example, under the ESA, any interested person

prejudiced by the delay; and (6) whether there is any impropriety ‘lurking behind agency
lassitude’ (although such a finding is not essential to a determination that agency action has
been unreasonably delayed).” (citing Telecomms. Res. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 78, 80
(D.C. Cir. 1984))).
60. Id. at 970.
61. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013).
Pursuant to a settlement extending and staggering these deadlines, FDA dropped its appeal to
the Ninth Circuit in February 2014. See Lydia Zuraw, FSMA Gets New Deadlines for Final
Rules, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/fsma
-gets-new-deadlines-for-final-rules/#.UwgdAKCRjww.
62. See Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002)
(providing that if Congress provides a specific deadline, “no balancing of factors is required
or permitted”).
63. Letter from Michael M. Landa, Director, Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, FDA,
to Audrae Erickson, President, Corn Refiners Ass’n (May 30, 2012) (response to petition from Corn
Refiners Association to authorize “corn sugar” as an alternate common or usual name for high
fructose corn syrup (HFCS)), available at http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/CentersOffices
/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/CFSANFOIAElectronicReadingRoom/ucm305226.htm.
64. Id.
65. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted).

1058

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1047

can petition the relevant secretary to add a species to the endangered or threatened
lists under the statute.68 After receiving the petition, the relevant agency must respond
“[t]o the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days,” with a preliminary finding
about whether further action is warranted.69 If further action is necessary, the agency
must make findings regarding the petition within twelve months.70 A missed deadline
provides the opportunity for an interested party to sue for action, and provides a court
with delineated criteria on which to order action, even if such action is procedural.71
Certain provisions of the FDCA work similarly. For example, in 1958, the Food
Additives Amendment to the FDCA put into place a process whereby new
ingredients had to be tested and approved before they could be used.72 Any person
may file a petition with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate the
safe use of a food additive.73 The relevant statute prescribes specific information that
the petition must contain, as well as specific deadlines for a response.74 If a party is
seeking the repeal or amendment of a food additive regulation, it can file a food
additive petition under 21 C.F.R. § 171.1. The petitioner is required to provide
information on the changes, and FDA must follow the statutory deadlines for
responding to a new additive petition.75
Parties can also petition for a change to an existing food additive regulation using
the citizen petition provision of the FDCA, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30.76 This route entails
“far less supporting data than the food additive petition, and the petitioner does not
bear the burden of establishing that an additive is safe or unsafe.”77 FDA is required
to respond to a citizen petition within 180 days, but may file a “tentative response”
explaining why it could not reach a decision.78
There is also a specific petition provision within the Medical Device Amendments
of 1976. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360g, “any person adversely affected by such
regulation or order may file a petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia or for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal
place of business for judicial review of such regulation or order.”79 The provision
includes a detailed list of the actions that may be challenged under this provision,
including the denial of a request for reclassification of a device and the issuance of a

68. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012). The ESA is administered by both the Department
of the Interior and the Department of Commerce, and the relevant secretary depends on the
species to be protected.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
71. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996)
(petitioner sued Secretary of Commerce for not responding to its petition to list coho salmon
as an endangered or protected species in certain states).
72. The definition of “food additive” excludes many categories of ingredients, including
ingredients approved before 1958. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012).
73. Id. § 348(b)(1).
74. Id. § 348(b)(2), (c)(2).
75. 21 C.F.R. §§ 171.1(c), 171.100 (2013).
76. See supra Part I.A.
77. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. 21 U.S.C. § 360g(a) (2012).
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regulation banning a device.80 If, however, a petitioner’s claim does not fall into one
of the categories outlined in § 360g, she must file her claim in district court.81
District courts may require petitioners challenging FDA inaction that does not fall
within the requirements of a specific petition provision of the FDCA to first utilize 21
C.F.R. § 10.30, the citizen petition provision.82 Courts, however, can waive this
requirement because “the citizen petition procedure is a regulatory rather than a
statutory creation.” In fact, courts have specifically waived this nonstatutory exhaustion
requirement because of FDA delay in responding substantively to citizen petitions.83
The availability of a statutory specific provision can provide petitioners and courts
with specific benchmarks to gauge an agency’s response or a specific route to judicial
review. When a challenged action or inaction falls outside of the bounds of these
specific provisions, petitioners must use the APA’s unreasonable delay provision or
a general citizen petition provision to bring suit, which provide courts with less
concrete markers to review an agency’s performance.
II. WHEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IS NOT ENOUGH
This Part turns to cases where private enforcement has failed to effectively
oversee FDA, an agency with vital importance to health and safety. In each of these
cases, a private party sought action from FDA and moved, either by petitioning the
Agency or by bringing suit, to compel action. And in each of these cases, the
mechanism of private enforcement has not been effective in countering intolerable
delay or arbitrary decision making. As noted above, this Article does not characterize
private enforcement as having failed because the private party has not achieved the
particular outcome sought. In fact, in several of these cases the particular outcome
desired has been achieved, but after too much time has passed. Private party
oversight is simply not effectively overcoming agency inertia. The Article then
compares these episodes with areas where private enforcement has been extremely
effective in compelling agency action.

80. Id. § 360g(a)(3), (5).
81. See Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“If judicial
review of an FDA action or inaction is not provided for in the Act, challenges to such actions
may be brought only in the district court.”). This case settled a year after petitioners were
denied relief in the court of appeals when FDA acceded to their request and agreed to classify
mercury fillings.
82. See, e.g., Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 446 F. App’x 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Cody
argues that it will be unduly prejudiced if forced to exhaust because the FDA is sometimes
dilatory in substantively responding to citizen petitions. . . . [But] [i]t is clear that Cody would
not be unduly—or even significantly—prejudiced by following FDA regulations and filing a
citizen petition.”).
83. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 30–31 (D.D.C. 1997)
(“The FDA regulations require the agency to respond to a Citizen Petition within 180 days of
its receipt, see 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2), in Bracco’s case, by the end of June 1997. The Court
was advised during oral argument, however, that a ‘response’ might consist only of a letter
advising a petitioner that the agency needs more time to consider the matter. Forcing plaintiffs
to await the FDA’s response to their Citizen Petitions would permit the FDA to continue the
disparate treatment of plaintiffs’ products that is causing them to spend millions of dollars in
testing fees and costs.”).
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A. Antibiotics in Animal Feed
In 2011, after decades of inertia and delay by FDA, five consumer advocacy
groups filed suit against FDA for failing to withdraw the approval of certain
antibiotics used in animal feed for the purpose of increasing food production.84
FDA approved new animal drug applications for penicillin and two kinds of
tetracycline in the 1950s, after it was discovered that certain antibiotics improved
food production when they were fed to animals at levels below those necessary to
cure disease (subtherapeutic levels).85 In the mid-1960s, FDA began to consider
whether the use of antibiotics in animals at subtherapeutic levels might lead to
antibiotic resistance in organisms that cause human disease; and, in 1970, the Agency
convened a task force consisting of scientists from FDA, the National Institutes of
Health, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Centers for Disease Control,
and representatives from academia and industry to study this and related issues.86
In 1972, the FDA task force issued its report.87 It found that antibiotic-resistance
prevalence has increased in humans; that the use of antibiotics, especially at
subtherapeutic levels, leads to antibiotic-resistant organisms; that animals receiving
antibiotics in feed may serve as reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant pathogens that can
produce human infections; and that antibiotic-resistant organisms have been found
on meat and meat products.88
The task force recommended that antibiotics used as human medicine, including
penicillin and tetracyclines, be prohibited from use in animal feed for subtherapeutic
purposes.89 In 1973, FDA issued a regulation “propos[ing] to revoke currently
approved subtherapeutic (increased rate of gain, disease prevention[,] etc.) uses in
animal feed of antibiotic and sulfonamide drugs whether granted by approval of new
animal drug applications, master files and/or antibiotic or food additive regulations, by
no later than April 20, 1975,” and allowing for the submission of material by industry
supporting the continued approval of these drugs along a specified timeline.90

84. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
85. Id. at 131; Eugene Lambert & Jeannie Perron, Veterinary Food and Drugs, in FOOD
AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 247, 269 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
86. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 129. The other issues include whether
antibiotic-resistant strains of organisms, if they were created by the use of subtherapeutic doses
of antibiotics in animals, could be transferred from animals to humans, and whether a
resistance “carrier” would affect other antibiotics besides those specifically used in animal
feed. Lambert and Perron comment that these questions are “perhaps impossible to answer.”
Lambert & Perron, supra note 85, at 274.
87. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed. Reg. 2444–45 (proposed
Feb. 1, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 135).
88. Id.
89. Id. At the same time, the Swann Committee in Great Britain came to similar
conclusions, and restrictions were placed on antibiotic use in animal feed in England. Lambert
& Perron, supra note 85, at 274. The Task Force noted that “[a]ntimicrobial agents used in
human clinical medicine” that met certain safety guidelines in regard to growth promotion and
subtherapeutic use could be used, but proposed shifting the burden to manufacturers to show
the drugs’ safety and efficacy. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed.
Reg. at 2444–45.
90. 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013).
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The revocation did not take place, and in 1977, a subcommittee of FDA’s National
Advisory Food and Drug Committee recommended the withdrawal of approval for
the subtherapeutic use of penicillin and that restrictions be made on the
subtherapeutic use of tetracyclines in animal feed.91 The Director of the Bureau of
Veterinary Medicine, a subdivision of FDA, issued notices of an opportunity for a
hearing (NOOHs) on the withdrawal of approvals for the subtherapeutic use of
penicillin and certain tetracyclines.92
A number of drug firms and agricultural groups requested hearings, and FDA
issued a statement that “a notice of hearing will be published in the [Federal Register]
as soon as practicable.”93 Subsequently, Congress made several statements
requesting that FDA wait for more information before withdrawing these
antibiotics,94 and FDA continued to research the risk of using subtherapeutic levels
of antibiotics in animal feed.95 The hearings were not held.
In 1983, FDA denied several petitions by industry requesting withdrawal of the
1977 NOOHs proposing the withdrawal of approval for antibiotics in animal feed,
but also began allowing the approval of new animal drug applications for the
subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed.96 FDA concluded
that new approvals should not be denied while its research was ongoing.97
Fast forward two decades to when FDA published a notice proposing to rescind
the sections in the Code of Federal Regulations from 1973 calling for the withdrawal
of approval for the subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed.98

91. Penicillin-Containing Premixes; Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,772 (Aug.
30, 1977); Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes;
Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977).
92. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
93. Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds, Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg.
53,827–28 (Nov. 17, 1978).
94. The nature of these requests is unclear. The federal district court opinion states that
“none of these recommendations was adopted by the full House or Senate, and none was
passed as law,” Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 135, implying that FDA should
have acted anyway, but a notice in the Federal Register states that the House Appropriations
Committee has “mandated that FDA withhold any restriction on the use of penicillin and the
tetracyclines (chlortetracycline and oxytetracycline) used in animal feeds until the National
Academy of Sciences has studied the matter,” Committee To Study the Human–Heath [sic]
Effects of Subtherapeutic Antibiotic Use in Animal Feeds; Public Meeting, 44 Fed. Reg.
36,479 (June 22, 1979). Even if the congressional statements were binding, the information
requested by Congress was not two decades in coming. FDA could have moved to acquire the
necessary studies and to hold the hearings during the early 1980s.
95. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
96. Drugs for Human Use; Drug Efficacy Study Implementation; Certain Anticholinergic
Drugs Containing Tridihexethyl Chloride; Withdrawal of Approval, 48 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Feb.
1, 1983); New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin and Tetracycline
(Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. 4490 (proposed
Feb. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 558).
97. New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin and Tetracycline
(Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. at 4490.
98. New Animal Drugs; Removal of Obsolete and Redundant Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg.
47,272 (proposed Aug. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 510, 558).
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The notice explained that these sections should be removed because they “long ago
fulfilled [their] stated purpose of requiring sponsors to submit data regarding the
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics on the market at the time of its publication,” and
because “over time FDA developed a new strategy and concept to deal with the issue
of antimicrobial resistance.”99
This 2003 notice is striking in two regards. First is its far-fetched justification for
proposing the withdrawal of the sections calling for the withdrawal of approval for
antibiotics in animal feed.100 It is clear from the face of the original call for hearings
that its purpose was not information gathering, but rather the withdrawal of approval
for antibiotics. The first sentence of the notice FDA proposed to withdraw is,
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs will propose to revoke currently
approved subtherapeutic (increased rate of gain, disease prevention[,]
etc.) uses in animal feed of antibiotic and sulfonamide drugs . . . unless
data are submitted which resolve conclusively the issues concerning their
safety to man and animals and their effectiveness under specific criteria
established by the Food and Drug Administration.101
This leads to the second striking aspect of the notice, which is the description of
the history of the “antimicrobial resistance issue” included by FDA.102 This history
shows a consistent account of numerous studies, conducted over decades by various
national and international bodies, finding that the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in
animal feed is dangerous to human health.103
In 2010, FDA released a draft guidance titled “The Judicious Use of Medically
Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals,” recommending that
antibiotics used for human medicine not be used for growth promotion in
animals104—the same recommendation FDA had made four decades earlier.
In May 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, the Food Animal Concerns Trust, Public Citizen, and
the Union of Concerned Scientists, Inc. brought suit against FDA, alleging that FDA
had “withheld agency action,” and had therefore violated the FDCA and the APA.105
Plaintiffs alleged that FDA had violated section 512 of the FDCA,106 which provides
for the withdrawal of an approved animal drug if the drug is found to be unsafe, and
that the court should “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed” under the authority granted by APA section 706(1).107 Furthermore,
plaintiffs argued that the FDCA required the Agency to withdraw approval of
penicillin and tetracyclines for subtherapeutic use in animal feed once it was found

99.
100.
101.
102.
47,272.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 47,274.
See id.
21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013).
New Animal Drugs; Removal of Obsolete and Redundant Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg.
Id.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 130.
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
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that they had not been shown to be safe for humans, unless the drug sponsors could
demonstrate the drugs’ safety.108
In their complaint, plaintiffs also moved to compel responses to two citizen
petitions they had filed in 1999 and 2005 requesting withdrawal of approval for these
antibiotic uses, to which the Agency had never replied.109 During the suit, FDA
issued denials to these petitions and plaintiffs amended their complaint to argue that
the denials were arbitrary and capricious.110
In response to the complaint, FDA argued that the FDCA’s provision on
withdrawing approval for animal drugs111 only required the Agency to withdraw
approval of an unsafe animal drug if the Secretary made a finding after a formal
hearing.112 FDA did not, of course, hold the hearings for which it had given notice and
did not, therefore, make those findings. It argued that it was not required to do either.113
The district court disagreed with FDA’s interpretation of its statute, finding that
the “plain meaning of § 360b(e)(1) requires the Secretary to issue notice and an
opportunity for a hearing whenever he finds that a new animal drug is not shown to
be safe.”114 The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs in March
2012, finding that FDA must “re-issue a notice of the proposed withdrawals (which
may be updated) and provide an opportunity for a hearing to the relevant drug

108. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41.
109. These petitions were most likely filed under the general citizen petition provision, 21
C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014), as 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2012), the statutory section regarding new animal
drugs, does not contain a petition provision for the withdrawal of animal drugs.
110. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 137 n.6; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
111. In relevant part, the provision reads:
The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the
applicant, issue an order withdrawing approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section with respect to any new animal drug if the Secretary
finds—
(A) that experience or scientific data show that such drug is unsafe for use
under the conditions of use upon the basis of which the application was approved or
the condition of use authorized under subsection (a)(4)(A) of this section . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1).
112. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. An article written by Lisa
Heinzerling discusses FDA’s insistence on the need to hold a formal hearing, which she argues
is unnecessary and anachronistic, and the Agency dysfunction that led to this position. Lisa
Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and Agency Intransigence,
37 VT. L. REV. 1017 (2013).
113. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
114. Id. at 143. When a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of a statute, it “must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). If the court finds the language of the statute
unambiguous, its inquiry stops there. If the intent of Congress is not clear, the “court will defer
to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long as it is ‘reasonable.’” Natural Res. Def.
Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). Here, the court
determined that the plain language of the statute was unambiguous, but even if it was not,
FDA’s own regulations contradicted the stance that they were taking in the immediate
litigation. Id. at 143–44.
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sponsors . . . . If, at the hearing, the drug sponsors fail to show that the use of the
drugs is safe, the Commissioner must issue a withdrawal order.”115
As to plaintiffs’ claims that FDA’s denials of their 1999 and 2005 citizen petitions
were arbitrary and capricious, the district court agreed in June 2012, granting
plaintiffs summary judgment on this claim as well. The court wrote,
[T]he Court finds the Agency’s denial of the Petitions to be arbitrary and
capricious. For over thirty years, the Agency has been confronted with
evidence of the human health risks associated with the widespread
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, and, despite
a statutory mandate to ensure the safety of animal drugs, the Agency has
done shockingly little to address these risks. Now, in responding to this
litigation and two Petitions that have been pending for years, requesting
that the Agency comply with its statutory mandate, the Agency has
refused to make any findings and instead intends to adopt a voluntary
program that is outside the statutory regulatory scheme.116
The case was appealed,117 and, in the interim, FDA announced a new voluntary
plan to reduce the use of nontherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed.118 On July 24,
2014, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit
was persuaded by FDA’s reasoning, holding that plaintiffs’ reasoning would have
required FDA to make two findings, while the statute only called for one. The court
also found this interpretation to be consistent with the provision’s statutory context
and background legal concepts.119
On September 18, 2014, President Barack Obama released an executive order
titled “Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.”120 The accompanying national
strategy “recognizes that resistance can arise in humans, animals, and the
environment.”121 One of its objectives is to “[e]liminate the use of medically

115. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 151. FDA had withdrawn the NOOHs
issued in 1977 for the withdrawal of the approval for antibiotics during the suit, arguing that
the NOOHs were obsolete. Withdrawal of Notices of Opportunity for a Hearing; Penicillin
and Tetracycline Used in Animal Feed, 76 Fed. Reg. 79,697 (Dec. 22, 2011).
116. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014).
117. Natural Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
118. See Phasing Out Certain Antibiotic Use in Farm Animals, FDA (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm378100.htm.
119. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014). The dissent
points out that any reading of the provision in its larger context would show that once FDA
had made a preliminary finding that the drugs were unsafe, it was required to hold hearings on
their withdrawal. Id. at 177 (Katzmann, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs’ argument was the better
one because the primary purpose of the FDCA is to protect the public, because the statute’s
provisions regarding human drugs have always been construed to assume that withdrawal
hearings would follow a preliminary finding, and because administrative practice comports
with this sequence of events. Id. at 176–79.
120. Executive Order No. 13,676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 18, 2014).
121. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
BACTERIA 5 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb
_national_strategy.pdf.
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important antibiotics for growth promotion in animals.”122 However, the strategy also
relies on FDA’s voluntary programs to accomplish this in the United States.123
B. Making Emergency Contraception Available to All Women over the Counter
The decade-long saga concerning the provision of emergency contraception to
women without a prescription, which included a public, and very controversial,
dispute between the secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and FDA,124 seems finally to be drawing to a close. In April 2013, a federal
judge ordered FDA to “make levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives
available without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions within
thirty days,”125 and in June 2013, the government indicated to the court that it would
comply with this order and would not appeal.126 On June 20, 2013, FDA approved
the OTC sale of emergency contraception with no age restrictions.127
Plan B One-Step is an emergency contraceptive that can be taken within
seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy.128 In 1999, FDA
approved a new drug application (NDA) for Plan B, which became available by
prescription.129 Before a new drug can be sold in the United States, the drug’s sponsor
must submit an NDA to the Secretary of HHS.130 Each NDA is based on extensive
clinical testing and must demonstrate the new drug’s safety and effectiveness.131 If a

122. Id. at 8.
123. Id.
124. The dispute garnered much media attention and speculation regarding the political
nature of the HHS Secretary’s action. See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of
After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A1 (“For the first time ever, the Health and Human
Services secretary publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration . . . . The decision
avoided what could have been a bruising political battle over parental control and contraception
during a presidential election season.”); Rob Stein, Obama Administration Refuses To Relax Plan
B Restrictions, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2011, at A1; Matthew Herper, Did the Obama
Administration Throw the FDA Under the Bus?, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/matthewherper/2011/12/09/did-the-obama-administration-throw-the-fda-under-the-bus/.
Incidentally, HHS previously overruled FDA in 1985. See infra Part III.C.
125. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. 162, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
126. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12–CV–763 (ERK)(VVP), 2013 WL 2631163, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
127. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive for Use
Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm. In March
2014, FDA expanded access to emergency contraception over the counter with no age restrictions
to generic contraceptive pills. Julie Rovner, FDA To Increase Access to Generic Morning-After
Pills, NPR (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/03/02/284397995/fda-to
-increase-access-to-generic-morning-after-pills.
128. Plan B works by preventing eggs from becoming fertilized, as opposed to RU-486,
which acts on implanted embryos. See Pam Belluck, No Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After
Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1.
129. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
130. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
131. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2013).
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drug “is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by
law to administer such drug,” it must be categorized as a prescription drug.132
It is not uncommon for a new drug to be approved as a prescription drug and then
be considered for a switch to OTC status.133 A drug’s sponsor can request that a drug
be switched from prescription to OTC status by supplementing its NDA, or FDA can
promulgate a rule changing the drug’s status.134 Such a rulemaking can be initiated
by a citizen petition or by FDA itself.135 A switch to nonprescription status is based
on FDA’s finding that “the drug is safe and effective for use in self-medication as
directed in proposed labeling.”136
In early 2001, sixty-six petitioners filed a citizen petition with FDA requesting that
FDA switch all emergency contraceptives from prescription to OTC status. FDA filed
a “tentative response” to this petition pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e),137 but issued no
final ruling on the petition for five more years, when the Agency denied the petition.138
Between 2001 and 2006, however, FDA had been working with the sponsor of
the Plan B NDA on its submission of a supplemental new drug application (SNDA),
requesting that Plan B be switched to OTC status.139
This application was submitted in 2003, and FDA denied it in 2004.140 The
sponsor then submitted an amended application, requesting Plan B be made available
OTC to women over the age of sixteen,141 which was amended again in 2006 to
suggest OTC availability of Plan B to women over eighteen.142 This application was
approved in August 2006.143
In 2005, many of the original petitioners brought an action in district court seeking
to compel FDA to respond to their citizen petition.144 FDA denied the petition in June
2006, and the plaintiffs amended their suit to challenge FDA’s denial of their petition
as arbitrary and capricious under the APA.145 The basis for this claim was the
allegation that “FDA’s decisions were made in bad faith because they were
improperly influenced by political considerations wholly outside the scope of the
FDA’s statutory authority.”146

132. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2012).
133. Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
134. 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2013).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Recall that a “tentative response” only means that FDA must give a reason for its
failure to respond. This reason may be “the existence of other agency priorities,” among other
things. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii) (2012).
138. Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
139. Id. at 526–36.
140. Id. at 527–32.
141. Id. at 533.
142. Id. at 536.
143. Id.
144. The court noted that petitioners’ challenges to denials of citizen petitions are directly
reviewable in district court because they were not covered under a specific FDCA petition
provision providing for court of appeals jurisdiction. Id. at 539.
145. Id. at 538. Plaintiffs also filed constitutional challenges to the Agency’s denial of their
petition.
146. Id.
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In March 2009, the court agreed with plaintiffs, finding that plaintiffs “presented
unrebutted evidence of the FDA’s lack of good faith regarding its decisions on the
Plan B [OTC] switch applications.”147 The court remanded the case and directed
FDA to reconsider its decisions regarding the switch of Plan B to OTC use.148
The court’s conclusion that FDA had not acted in good faith was based on
evidence of:
(1) repeated and unreasonable delays, pressure emanating from the
White House, and the obvious connection between the confirmation
process of two FDA Commissioners and the timing of the FDA’s
decisions; and (2) significant departures from the FDA’s normal
procedures and policies in the review of the Plan B switch applications
as compared to the review of other switch applications in the past 10
years.149
The evidence listed by the court to support its conclusions was extensive, and
included (1) the fact that FDA’s scientific review staff and advisory committees
recommended OTC availability of Plan B without age restrictions; (2) the evidence
of White House pressure on FDA; (3) the arbitrary restriction of OTC availability to
women over eighteen; (4) the inclusion of additional, unqualified members on an
advisory committee; and (5) the refusal to extrapolate data in ways that had
commonly been done in the past.150
Notably, the court addressed concerns that remanding the issue to FDA would be
futile. It commented that “circumstances have changed,” leading the court to believe that
the Agency could be “trusted to conduct a fair assessment of the scientific evidence.”151
FDA, however, did nothing. In 2011, plaintiffs in the original suit sought to hold
the Agency in contempt of court.152 Simultaneously, the manufacturer of Plan B
submitted an SNDA to FDA for permission to market Plan B as a nonprescription
drug for all ages.

147. Id. at 544. The court found the issue of FDA’s denial of the OTC switch applications
to be “inextricably tied to its decision-making on the Citizen Petition.” Id. at 543.
148. The court remanded the issue of the Plan B OTC switch, but ordered FDA to allow
women over the age of seventeen OTC access to Plan B under the same conditions that women
over the age of eighteen were permitted access. The court found that here, “[a] remand would
serve no purpose,” because
[t]he record is clear: the FDA’s justification for the denial of OTC access to Plan
B for women over the age of 17–rather than 18–“runs counter to the evidence”
and “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.”
Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 544. The decision in this case provides a detailed and fascinating account of the
events leading to the lawsuit, and beyond.
150. Id. at 545–47.
151. Id. at 549.
152. Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Civil Contempt, Tummino v. Hamburg,
2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (No. 05-CV-366 (ERK)(VVP)), 2011 WL
7166996.
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During oral argument of the contempt action, the Commissioner of FDA issued a
statement with her opinion that Plan B should be approved as an OTC medication
for women of all ages.153 Her opinion was based on research conducted by the Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research, which “reviewed the totality of the data and
agreed that it met the regulatory standard for a nonprescription drug and that Plan B
One-Step should be approved for all females of child-bearing potential.”154
The Commissioner also explained that the Secretary of HHS, who is responsible
for executing the provisions of the FDCA,155 had directed her to disapprove the
application.156 The Secretary of HHS issued her own memorandum, explaining that
“the data submitted for this product do not establish that prescription dispensing
requirements should be eliminated for all ages.”157
In February 2012, plaintiffs to the original suit supplemented their complaint
against FDA and HHS, thereby reopening the case,158 and in April 2013, the judge
hearing the case granted plaintiffs’ petition and ordered FDA to make Plan B
available without a prescription to all ages. Explaining why he would not remand the
action to the Agency to begin a rulemaking proceeding, the judge stated,
The FDA has engaged in intolerable delays in processing the petition.
Indeed, it could accurately be described as an administrative agency
filibuster. . . . The plaintiffs should not be forced to endure, nor should
the agency’s misconduct be rewarded by, an exercise that permits the
FDA to engage in further delay and obstruction.159
Beyond the judge’s strong condemnation of FDA’s actions in this case, it is
notable that in his decision he did not focus solely on the political ramifications of
the case. Instead he noted, and emphasized, the mundane character of the nature of
the case:
[T]he issue in this case involves the interpretation of a general statutory
and regulatory scheme relating to the approval of drugs for
over-the-counter sale. The standards are the same for aspirin and for
contraceptives. . . . [T]he standard for determining whether
contraceptives or any other drug should be available over-the-counter

153. Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D. on Plan B One-Step,
FDA (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm282805.htm [hereinafter
Hamburg Statement].
154. Id.
155. 21 U.S.C. § 393(d)(2) (2012).
156. Hamburg Statement, supra note 153.
157. Memorandum from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to Margaret
A. Hamburg, M.D., Comm’r of Food & Drugs (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com
/public/resources/documents/20111207a.pdf.
158. Rachel Slajda, FDA Faces Renewed Battle over Plan B Age Restrictions, LAW360 (Feb.
8, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/307696/fda-faces-renewed-battle-over-plan
-b-age-restrictions; Tummino v. Hamburg (NY), CENTER FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/tummino-v-hamburg-ny.
159. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. 162, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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turns solely on the ability of the consumer to understand how to use the
particular drug “safely and effectively.”160
For this reason, the outcome of the case, according to the judge, depended on the
judicial interpretation of the relevant statutory standards, which, according to the
court, were clear.161 The case, however, took years to resolve.162
C. A Historical Example: The Prohibition of the Interstate Sale of Raw Milk
We see that FDA can delay responding to petitions brought under the FDCA’s
general petition provision and that judicial review of this delay only takes place when
a petitioner sues to force action. This is not a recent phenomenon.
In 1973, pursuant to its authority to issue regulations regarding standards of quality
for food,163 FDA promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of all unpasteurized milk
products in interstate commerce.164 Due to questions regarding whether it was necessary
to ban the interstate sales of certified raw milk to protect the public health, the Agency

160. Id. at 169.
161. See id.
162. It is hard to generalize about the trajectory of emergency contraception from
prescription to OTC status because of the politically fraught environment in which this
decision was made. Concerns about the sexual activity of teenagers and the public’s
uncertainty regarding how emergency contraception actually works influenced the
conversation regarding the switch of the drug from prescription to OTC status and FDA’s
convoluted handling of the matter. The uniqueness of the issue was illustrated by the way in
which the Agency repeatedly and markedly diverged from its usual practices and policies in
making the switch. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. at 169 (FDA rode “roughshod
over the policies and practices that it has consistently applied in considering applications for
switches in drug status to over-the-counter availability.”); Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d
519, 544–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing improper political influence on FDA’s
decision-making process and “significant departures from the FDA’s normal procedures and
policies in the review of the Plan B switch applications as compared to the review of other
switch applications in the past 10 years”). This case is still instructive, however. FDA used its
“tentative response” tool to delay answering a citizen petition requesting the drug’s status shift,
and it took almost a decade for the case to be heard by a court. Moreover, even after finding
that FDA had diverged from its normal policies and procedures in 2009, which indicated a
susceptibility to political pressure, the court remanded the case to the Agency for disposition,
Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (remanding decision to Agency because different
decision makers were in place and because this decision was “best left to the expertise of the
FDA”), which reflected a culture of deference to FDA. Id. Courts usually remand to agencies
instead of granting affirmative relief. Nevertheless, the court here recognized serious
impropriety in the decision-making process by FDA, and for this reason it may have been
expected to forego a remand. On courts’ historical deference to FDA, see DANIEL CARPENTER,
REPUTATION AND POWER 361 (2010).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
164. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (D.D.C. 1986).
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stayed the regulation.165 “Certified raw milk” is unpasteurized milk that satisfies
standards established by the American Association of Medical Milk Commissions.166
FDA collected information from 1974 to 1982, and in 1982 wrote a proposed
regulation banning the interstate sale of all raw milk based on evidence that the
consumption of raw milk was linked to bacterial disease.167 High-level officials at
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease
Control supported this regulation, and statistical support was provided by the Chief
of the Bureau of Foods Epidemiology and Clinical Toxicology Division in 1984.168
The Agency, however, did not file the proposed regulations.
Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization, filed a citizen petition with
FDA in 1984, seeking a ban on the sale of raw milk, both interstate and intrastate.169
FDA did not respond to the petition, but sent letters in response to follow-up
correspondence from Public Citizen. These letters stated that the matter was being
considered and that hearings would be held, but detailed no schedule for action.170
Public Citizen then filed a lawsuit in district court requesting that the court order
FDA to respond to its petition.171
The district court ruled for Public Citizen, finding that “[t]he Department’s
justification for its continued delay is lame at best and irresponsible at worst.”172 The
court explained:
The facts here speak for themselves and need little elaboration. Officials
at the highest levels of the Department of Health and Human Services
have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to the public
health. Leading health organizations are unanimous in proposing that
sales of any raw milk should be banned. The Food and Drug
Administration has twice proposed, in 1973 and 1983, that all milk in
interstate commerce be pasteurized. Hundreds of cases of serious
gastrointestinal infections have been reported since the ban on raw milk
sales was first proposed.173
Under its authority given by the APA to “compel agency action . . . unreasonably
delayed,”174 the court ordered FDA to rule on the petition within sixty days.175

165. Milk and Cream, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (Oct. 10, 1973) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
18) (stayed by Identity Standards for Milk and Cream; Order Staying Certain Provisions, 39
Fed. Reg. 42,351 (Dec. 5, 1974)).
166. See Public Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1232.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1233.
169. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D.D.C. 1985).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 613.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
175. Public Citizen, 602 F. Supp. at 614.
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In response to the court’s ruling, FDA held hearings and, based on the findings
from these hearings, recommended a proposed rule to the Secretary of HHS banning
the interstate sale of raw milk.176
The Secretary of HHS, however, rejected FDA’s recommendation and directed
the Agency to deny the petition.177 While acknowledging the detrimental health
effects of the consumption of raw milk, the Secretary reasoned that this was a matter
better left to state control.178
Public Citizen and other plaintiffs brought another action to challenge the denial
of their petition, and in 1986, the court found the Secretary’s action to be arbitrary
and capricious, and directed FDA to ban the interstate sale of raw milk.179 The court
discussed the appropriateness of the judicial review of an agency’s decision not to
engage in rulemaking, finding that the policy reasons underlying deference to such
an agency decision were not present in this case.180 In particular, the decision did not
implicate FDA’s budget, as FDA already regulated noncertified raw milk; there were
no indications of competing policy considerations; and there was a full
administrative record for the court to review, which eliminated the concern that the
judicial review would be based on hypotheticals.181
The court found that the Secretary’s explanation for the decision to ban the
petition “runs counter to the voluminous evidence to the contrary she had before her
. . . [and] has no rational connection to the undisputed facts in the record.”182 The
court also found a remand to be unnecessary because the record itself was clear as to
the scientific justification for banning interstate sales of raw milk.183
The court in this case did not trace the decision by HHS to deny the citizen petition
to any specific pressure from the administration, as did the court in the Plan B case.
However, the availability and legality of raw milk has been tinged with controversy
for decades.184

176. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1235 (D.D.C. 1986).
177. This is what happened during the Plan B decision making process, and it was viewed
as shocking by commentators. See, e.g., Sam Baker, Left ‘Speechless’ as Sebelius Overrules
FDA on Access to Morning-After Pill, HILL (D.C.), Dec. 8, 2011, at P1.
178. Public Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1240.
179. Id. at 1242.
180. Id. at 1239–40.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1240–41.
183. Id. at 1241.
184. See, e.g., Elena Conis, The Raw Milk Debate Rages On, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at
F3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/02/health/he-nutrition2; Dana Goodyear,
Raw Deal, NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2012, at 32. The tenor of the debate regarding the ban on
interstate sales of raw milk may have been influenced by a 1985 foodborne illness outbreak in
California, which killed dozens of people. This outbreak was traced tentatively to raw milk
used in cheese, although this finding was disputed. See Ronald L. Soble, Panel Blames Jalisco
in Listerosis Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1985, at A5; Sally Fallon Morell, Is Raw Milk Safe
for Babies?, REAL MILK (Dec. 31, 2001), http://www.realmilk.com/safety/is-raw-milk-safe
-for-babies/ (tracing 1985 outbreak to pasteurized milk). Note that tracing mechanisms for
foodborne illness outbreaks were undeveloped in the 1980s.
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D. A Prospective Example: The Dispute over the Removal of
Bisphenol A from Food Packaging
In 2008, NRDC filed a citizen petition with FDA requesting that FDA revoke all
regulations permitting the use of bisphenol A (BPA) in food packaging.185 BPA is a
chemical that has been used in food packaging, including baby bottles, sippy cups,
and formula containers, for decades.186 Humans are exposed to BPA when it leaches
into food from packaging.187
BPA has been the subject of controversy for several years. In 2008, after the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and the National Toxicology Program wrote
a report calling for research into BPA’s potentially toxic effects, FDA began to study
the chemical.188 The tests done by FDA scientists showed that humans did not retain
BPA in their bodies, that it was passed by pregnant mothers to the fetus only minimally,
and that there was no evidence of toxicity at low doses in rodent studies.189
Numerous other studies, however, found BPA to have harmful effects, and FDA
has been criticized for relying on only a small sample of industry-funded studies.190
In the petition, NRDC wrote that rodent studies have shown BPA to have numerous
harmful effects, which occur at levels of exposure found in the general public. The
group pointed to research showing a correlation between BPA exposure and adverse
effects on human health, and concluded that “[t]he weight of the scientific evidence
now shows that human exposure to BPA can not [sic] be confirmed safe.”191
NRDC petitioned FDA under section 409 of the FDCA, which regulates food
additives,192 and under regulations issued by FDA regarding substances prohibited
for use in human food. The group utilized the procedure for amending or repealing
the standards approved for certain food additives and the procedure for submitting a
citizen petition to FDA.193

185. Natural Res. Def. Council, Citizen Petition 1 (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://docs.nrdc.org/health/files/hea_08102001a.pdf.
186. Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Makes It Official: Chemical Can’t Be Used in Baby Bottles
and Cups, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A15.
187. FDA, FDA CONTINUES TO STUDY BPA (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov
/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm297954.htm.
188. Id.; Helena Bottemiller, FDA Denies Petition To Ban BPA in Food and Beverage
Containers, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03
/fda-denies-petition-to-ban-bpa-in-food-and-beverage-containers/#.VBuYzqC8_ww.
189. FDA CONTINUES TO STUDY BPA, supra note 187. A new study also shows that the
chemical has little to no effect in the amounts that humans are exposed to. See Jon Hamilton,
Maybe That BPA in Your Canned Food Isn’t So Bad After All, NPR (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/02/26/283030949/government-studies-suggest-bpa
-exposure-from-food-isn-t-risky.
190. Lynn Harris, BPA: How Bad Is It?, BABBLE (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.babble.com
/baby/baby-health-safety/bpa-plastic-to-avoid-bispenol-a-safe-bottles/#fbConnectSection.
191. Natural Res. Def. Council, supra note 185, at 7–9. The harmful effects seen in rodent
studies include “reproductive defects, chromosomal damage, nervous system harm, increased
rates of breast and prostate cancer, and metabolic changes including obesity and insulin
resistance.” Id. at 2.
192. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012).
193. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.30, 171.30, 189.1 (2013); see also supra Part I.A.
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FDA responded to NRDC’s petition with a “tentative response,”194 stating that it
could not reach a final decision because of the “limited availability of resources and
other agency priorities.”195 After more than a year passed, NRDC filed suit seeking
to compel a denial or acceptance of its petition.196 In December 2011, NRDC and
FDA settled. FDA agreed to make a decision whether to ban BPA from food
packaging by March 31, 2012.197
FDA denied NRDC’s petition on March 30, 2012. The Agency found that the
studies used by NRDC were limited, and the information in the petition “was not
sufficient to persuade FDA, at this time, to initiate rulemaking to prohibit the use of
BPA in human food and food packaging.” FDA stated that it would continue to
research BPA.198
In July 2012, FDA banned the use of BPA in baby bottles and sippy cups. The
Agency stated that it did not take this action in response to health concerns, but rather
acted in response to a request by the chemical industry’s main trade association,
which had already stopped using it in these products and was interested in boosting
consumer confidence and reducing confusion.199 In July 2014, several legislators
introduced a bill to ban BPA from food packaging.200 This bill, the Ban Poisonous
Additives Act of 2014, failed in Congress.201

194. This “tentative response” is permitted pursuant to the regulation issued by FDA regarding
the procedure for submitting citizen petitions. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30; see also supra Part I.A.
195. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
196. Id. at 400. NRDC initially filed suit in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for
an order directing FDA to respond to the petition. The court dismissed NRDC’s suit, finding
that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over citizen petitions. See id. NRDC then
brought suit in district court.
197. Ross Anderson, FDA Agrees To Respond on BPA Risk by March 31, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/12/fda-agrees-to-respondon-bpa-risk-by-march-31/#.VBuZDqC8_ww.
198. Letter from David H. Dorsey, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Policy & Planning, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., to Sarah Janssen & Aaron Colangelo, Natural Res. Def. Council
(Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/health/files/hea_12033001a.pdf.
199. See Indirect Food Additives: Adhesives and Components of Coatings, 78 Fed. Reg.
41,840 (July 12, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 175); Tavernise, supra note 186.
200. Chelsea Rice, Congress Considering Bill To Ban BPA from Food Packaging,
BOSTON.COM (July 10, 2014, 1:54 PM), http://www.boston.com/health/2014/07/10/congress
-considering-bill-ban-bpa-from-food-packaging/JkXwdurEMLTkdpsENS30jJ/story.html.
201. H.R. 5033 (113th): Ban Poisonous Additives Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5033. It is worth noting that a government study
published in early 2014 showed that there was no effect on rats of ingesting thousands of times
what humans eat. See K. Barry Delclos, Luísa Camacho, Sherry M. Lewis, Michelle M.
Vanlandingham, John R. Latendresse, Greg R. Olson, Kelly J. Davis, Ralph E. Patton,
Gonçalo Gamboa da Costa, Kellie A. Woodling, Matthew S. Bryant, Mani Chidambaram,
Raul Trbojevich, Beth E. Juliar, Robert P. Felton & Brett T. Thorn, Toxicity Evaluation of
Bisphenol A Administered by Gavage to Sprague Dawley Rats from Gestation Day 6 Through
Postnatal Day 90, TOXICOLOGICAL SCI., Feb. 24, 2014, at 9, 21; Hamilton, supra note 189.
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E. The Inadequacy of Private Enforcement
In all of these examples, private parties petitioned FDA to take certain actions—
hold hearings on the safety of the subtherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed, revoke the
approval for BPA in food packaging, switch Plan B to OTC status, and ban the sale of
certified raw milk—and brought suit to compel a response to their petitions and/or to
contest the Agency’s denials. In the contexts of animal antibiotics, the Plan B switch,
and the ban on raw milk, FDA itself had publicly acknowledged that the actions the
petitioners sought would benefit the public health, and in regard to BPA, FDA actually
took one of the steps suggested by petitioners even after denying the petition.
It may seem counterintuitive to characterize these cases as demonstrating the
inadequacy of private enforcement when, in each, private entities achieved at least some
measure of success. However, in each of these cases we see extensive delay, agency
recalcitrance, evidence of arbitrary decision making, and repeated episodes of judicial
review. These trajectories are unacceptable in the context of health and safety regulation.202
In some areas where private enforcement is more successful in compelling agency
action, such as in the promulgation of standards under the CWA, or the listing of
species under the ESA, political and economic interests are also implicated. The
difference, however, is that the statutes under which private parties successfully
move to compel regulation have more clearly articulated criteria and requirements,
and contain more deadlines for action. The greater precision of these statutes has
encouraged more litigation in these contexts, as well as less judicial deference to the
relevant agencies.203
III. WHEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IS SUCCESSFUL
This Part will describe two areas of law in the environmental context where
private enforcement has been very effective in compelling agency action for the
purpose of comparing the relevant statutory scheme to that used by citizens seeking
to compel FDA action.204
A. A Comparison with EPA’s Role in Setting Water Quality Standards
Under the Clean Water Act
The goal of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”205 The CWA declares that the

202. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable
when human health and welfare are at stake . . . .”).
203. There are, of course, more reasons why there is more advocacy group litigation in
the environmental context than the food and drug context. See Diana R. H. Winters, Not
Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
905, 916–29 (2012).
204. For additional discussions of the success of private enforcement in these contexts, see,
e.g., Biber & Brosi, supra note 12; Glicksman, supra note 11, at 373–80 (TMDLs); Meazell,
supra note 10, at 1774–80 (various cases).
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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elimination of “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters” is a national
goal and the prohibition of “the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts” is a
national policy.206
Under the CWA, each state must identify bodies of water that are more polluted
and thus require additional limitations on effluent and thermal discharges than are
required under other parts of the statute.207 The state must then establish a “total
maximum daily load” (TMDL) of EPA-identified pollutants for these waters.208
States are required to submit the lists of waters and TMDLs to EPA for approval, and
EPA then has to approve or disapprove each submission.209 The statute contains
deadlines with which the states and EPA must comply.210
After the passage of the CWA, many states did not meet their obligations to
establish TMDLs, and EPA did not enforce the program.211 To enforce the program,
environmental advocacy groups began to file lawsuits under the citizen suit provision
of the CWA.212 Pursuant to this provision, “any citizen may commence a civil action
on his own behalf,” against alleged violators of the CWA, and “against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any
act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”213
Citizen suits to enforce the TMDL program were very successful. In Scott v. City of
Hammond, Indiana, a citizen sued EPA for, among other things, its failure to set forth
TMDLs for the discharge of pollutants into Lake Michigan.214 EPA argued that it could
not do so because Indiana had not submitted its list of TMDLs, as was statutorily
required.215 The Seventh Circuit held that the failure of the relevant states to submit
TMDLs to EPA by the statutory deadline did not absolve EPA of its duty to promulgate
TMDLs under the statute.216 The court reasoned that the absence of a state submission
should be read as a “constructive submission” of no TMDLs.217 EPA could either
approve this no-TMDL submission or disapprove it, in which case it was required to
promulgate its own TMDLs.218 Either decision could be challenged in court. In his
article on the value of agency-forcing citizen suits, Robert L. Glicksman notes that this

206. Id. § 1251(a)(1), (3).
207. See id. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (B).
208. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C); see also id. § 1314(a)(2).
209. Id. § 1313(d)(2).
210. Id. (providing that states have 180 days after EPA issues list of pollutants to submit
list of bodies of water and TMDLs, and EPA has thirty days after this submission to respond).
211. Glicksman, supra note 11, at 374 (citing OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 51 (1999)).
212. Id. (“Against a background of federal environmental programs in which litigation has
played a central role, it is hard to think of any program more precipitously driven by citizen suits
from absolute zero toward its statutory destiny than TMDLs.” (quoting OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 75 (1999)).
213. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
214. 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984).
215. Id. (“The district court agreed with the EPA that the EPA is not required to act unless
and until the state submits a proposed TMDL.”).
216. Id. at 996–97.
217. Id. at 996.
218. Id. at 997.
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“constructive submission” theory has been very influential, and that “TMDL citizen
suits have already served as an important break on agency footdragging.”219
Although the analogy is imperfect, we can compare FDA’s inaction in the field
of animal antibiotics to EPA’s inaction in the context of promulgating TMDLs. In
each case the agency did something that was supposed to lead to something else—in
the case of antibiotics, FDA issued a notice for an opportunity for a hearing on the
withdrawal of approval for certain antibiotics,220 and in the case of the TMDLs, EPA
issued the statutorily required list of pollutants221—but did not take the subsequent
action. Similarly, in each of the above-cited examples,222 members of the public
attempted to compel FDA to act in an area implicating the public health, and each
private party alleged that FDA had failed to take a statutorily mandated action. EPA
was “footdragging” here in completing statutorily mandated steps toward the
fulfillment of the statute’s ultimate purpose—the restoration and maintenance of the
integrity of the nation’s waters.223 In contrast, though, the FDCA does not have a
statement of purpose similar to that of the CWA. FDA’s stated purpose is to
protect[] the public health by assuring the safety, effectiveness, quality,
and security of human and veterinary drugs, vaccines and other
biological products, and medical devices. The FDA is also responsible
for the safety and security of most of our nation’s food supply, all
cosmetics, dietary supplements and products that give off radiation,224
but the FDCA contains no statement such as this.
Moreover, the actions FDA was required to take in the examples are less clearly
laid out than in the case of TMDLs. According to 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1), the
provision of the FDCA regarding the withdrawal of approval of an animal drug, the
Secretary “shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, issue
an order withdrawing approval” of an animal drug if such drug was shown to be
unsafe.225 Recall that FDA argued that it did not have to issue the withdrawal order
if it never held a hearing and made findings pursuant to that hearing, regardless of
any other findings it had made on the drug.226
The provision of the CWA governing TMDLs, which requires EPA to approve or
disapprove state submissions, is less open to interpretation by either the Agency or a
court. It also contains specific deadlines, which are easily reviewable by a court and
signal that Congress supported prompt Agency action in this context. The provision
reads:

219. Glicksman, supra note 11, at 374–75, 378.
220. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 133–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
221. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D) (2012); Scott, 741 F.2d at 996 n.10 (“EPA finally made
the necessary identifications on December 28, 1978, apparently under court order.”).
222. See supra Part II.A–D.
223. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
224. FDA Fundamentals, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics
/ucm192695.htm (last updated June 12, 2014).
225. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) (2012).
226. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41.
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Each State shall submit to the Administrator from time to time, with the
first such submission not later than one hundred and eighty days after the
date of publication of the first identification of pollutants under section
1314(a)(2)(D) of this title, for his approval the waters identified and the
loads established under paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) of
this subsection. The Administrator shall either approve or disapprove
such identification and load not later than thirty days after the date of
submission. If the Administrator approves such identification and load,
such State shall incorporate them into its current plan under subsection
(e) of this section. If the Administrator disapproves such identification
and load, he shall not later than thirty days after the date of such
disapproval identify such waters in such State and establish such loads
for such waters as he determines necessary to implement the water
quality standards applicable to such waters . . . .227
Granted, there is still ambiguity in the statute, as was litigated in the Seventh
Circuit—that is, what happens if the state fails to submit its list for approval?
Nevertheless, the existence of the deadlines better illustrates the wishes of Congress
and better illuminates the Agency’s failure to fulfill these wishes than does a statute
without deadlines.
Unlike the CWA, the FDCA does not contain a citizen suit provision. Petitioners
in the animal antibiotics suit (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. FDA228)
sued under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which gives courts the power to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”229 As the court in Natural Resources
Defense Council noted, “The Supreme Court has made clear that § 706(1) applies
only when an [sic]‘an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required
to take.’”230 In the animal antibiotics case, FDA contested both the “discrete action”
prong and the “required to take” prong, arguing that because a hearing was a prolonged
action, it was not a discrete action, and that it was not legally required to hold the
withdrawal hearings in any event.231 Similarly, under a citizen suit provision,
petitioners can only sue an agency for the failure to take nondiscretionary action.232
Suits under either provision are therefore functionally the same.233 The real difference
here is the lack of statutory deadlines.
Even though the court disagreed with FDA’s arguments, the plaintiffs in Natural
Resources Defense Council were more poorly equipped to force agency action than
were those in the TMDL cases, where the statute contained deadlines.

227. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
228. 884 F. Supp. 2d 127.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also supra Part II.A.
230. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (emphasis omitted) (citing Norton
v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)).
231. See supra Part II.A.
232. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (CWA citizen suit provision).
233. See Glicksman, supra note 11, at 369.
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B. A Comparison with the Petition Provisions of the Endangered Species Act
Citizen petitions have been very influential in shaping the trajectory of the ESA.234
Any interested person can petition an agency for the issuance of a rule under the
generic petition provision of the APA,235 and pursuant to this provision, any person
can petition the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) for a listing of a species as either endangered or threatened under
the ESA.236 Under the ESA, the relevant agency then has ninety days to determine
whether a filed petition should be investigated further, and then twelve months to
determine whether the requested action is warranted.237
These strict deadlines supplement the petition provision of the APA, which itself
only imposes a duty on the agency to respond within a reasonable time.238 The 1979
regulation,239 discussed above,240 detailing the procedure for the submission and
receipt of citizen petitions to FDA, also supplements the APA’s petition provision.
Like the ESA, this provision contains deadlines for FDA to respond to citizen
petitions.241 However, this regulation allows FDA to respond with a “tentative
response,” which must
indicat[e] why the agency has been unable to reach a decision on the
petition, e.g., because of the existence of other agency priorities, or a
need for additional information. The tentative response may also indicate
the likely ultimate agency response, and may specify when a final
response may be furnished.242
The “tentative response” mechanism was used by FDA in three out of four of the
examples above243 and allows FDA to comply with its regulatory duty while not
actually furnishing an answer to the petition.
The strict deadlines in the ESA’s petition provision force FWS or NMFS to
respond to a citizen petition. In contrast, FDA can respond tentatively, and thus parry
the request. The deadlines give citizen advocates a specific, nondiscretionary duty
that can be litigated if the agency fails to respond and allows a court to force action
without imposing on agency discretion.244 Although these deadlines do not mean that

234. See, e.g., Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at 324 (looking at petitioning under the ESA
to analyze how petitions and citizen suits affect environmental decision making).
235. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012); see also supra Part I.A.
236. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012). The FWS and the NMFS administer the ESA.
237. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A)–(B).
238. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at 327 n.19 (explaining that multiple provisions in
the APA, read together, have been read by courts to require a timely response from agencies).
239. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014).
240. See supra Part I.A.
241. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (“Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, the
Commissioner shall furnish a response to each petitioner within 180 days of receipt of the
petition.”).
242. Id. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii).
243. See supra Part II.A–D.
244. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. C 06-04186 WHA, 2007
WL 163244 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2007) (plaintiffs sued the FWS for not responding to their
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a petitioner will receive the result sought, they do mean that the agency can be
compelled to seriously consider the request. I do not mean to overstate the usefulness
of the petition deadlines. Emily Hammond shows in her article on serial litigation
that suits beginning as “straightforward deadline suit[s]” can last for decades with no
discernible change in the status of the species at issue.245 Nevertheless, response
deadlines are tools available for citizens seeking to compel agency action.
IV. HOW THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DETRIMENTALLY
AFFECTS PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The previous Part identified several episodes of FDA inaction that citizen
participation could not effectively address. These episodes have effects that
reverberate beyond their specific substantive impact. Although other institutions
have influence over administrative agencies, the oversight of private parties is a
crucial part of the administrative state, and its significance cannot be overstated.
Indeed, one commentator has noted that the APA itself “is essentially a one-trick
pony. All of its basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions
of administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”246
When private enforcement is ineffective, the transparency of agency decision
making is diminished, the interaction between deliberative bodies is reduced, and the
opportunity for public participation is lessened. In addition, any benefits of judicial
review to the administrative process are tempered by the dysfunction of the private
enforcement process. This Part discusses these harms, starting with the most direct
effects of agency inaction.
A. The Immediate Harm to Public Health
When an agency fails to act, it adversely affects the intended beneficiaries of the
relevant legislation.247 These adverse effects can implicate the structure of the
administrative state, and thus can be relatively abstract, or can be tangible and
immediate. With regard to FDA, the Agency’s failures can be enormously
consequential, although they may be difficult to quantify. For example, FDA did not
hold the hearings on the withdrawal of approval for the subtherapeutic use of certain
antibiotics in animal feed that it called for in 1977.248 We are left with two questions:
(1) Has new evidence shown “that such drug is not shown to be safe for use under
the conditions of use upon the basis of which the application was approved” pursuant
to the statutory provision outlining the procedure for withdrawing approval of an

petition that the Siskiyou Mountains salamander be listed as threatened or endangered under
the ESA).
245. Meazell, supra note 10, at 1747–53 (discussing the flat-tailed horned lizard cases).
246. Rubin, supra note 2, at 101.
247. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1381, 1400 (2011) (discussing costs of agency delay).
248. See supra Part II.A.
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animal drug?249 (2) If the answer to (1) is yes, and FDA had this information since
the early 1970s (which seems to be the case) what is the effect on public health?
Although the answer to (1) appears to be yes, and the court in Natural Resources
Defense Council based its opinion on this finding,250 FDA disagreed and asserted
that it had not made any such findings and that its consideration of the matter was
ongoing.251 But even if the answer was clear, the effect of the continued use of these
drugs is still uncertain. Numerous studies have shown some connection between the
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed and the growth of antibiotic-resistant
germs with the potential to harm humans, but these conclusions are contested.252
Difficult as it is to assess whether the public health has been harmed by FDA’s
failure to regulate antibiotics in animal feed, it is even more difficult to quantify the
effect of the Agency’s inaction with regard to switching emergency contraception from
prescription to OTC status. Indeed, this calculation melds science, policy, and morals
so completely that any such assessment is truly impossible. However, in Tummino v.
Hamburg, the court extensively detailed the burdens on women seeking emergency
contraception when such medicine could be obtained by prescription only.253 These
burdens, coupled with FDA’s acknowledgement that the medicine “should be
approved for all females of child-bearing potential,” led the court to the conclusion that
the “FDA has engaged in intolerable delays in processing the petition.”254
Although quantification of harm may be difficult, it goes without question that
the effect of agency inaction can be far reaching. In fact, the repercussions of delay
extend to the very structure of the administrative state.
B. The Reduced Visibility of Agency Decision Making
The APA’s procedural requirements are designed, in part, to ensure the
transparency of agency decision making.255 The “administrative law values of

249. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1)(B) (2012).
250. 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141, 149–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Antibiotic Debate Overview, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/meat/safe/overview.html (discussing controversy regarding feeding subtherapeutic
doses of antibiotics to animals and possible risk to human health); Richard Knox, How Using
Antibiotics in Animal Feed Creates Superbugs, NPR (Feb. 21, 2012, 11:10 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/02/21/147190101/how-using-antibiotics-in-animal
-feed-creates-superbugs (“A study in the journal mBio, published by the American Society for
Microbiology, shows how an antibiotic-susceptible staph germ passed from humans into pigs,
where it became resistant to the antibiotics tetracycline and methicillin. And then the antibioticresistant staph learned to jump back into humans.”); cf. Richard Raymond, Antibiotics Used in
Food-Producing Animals, MEATINGPLACE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.meatingplace.com
/Industry/Blogs/Details/38770 (stating that most antibiotics used in food-producing animals are
not used for human medicine).
253. 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
254. Id. at 167, 198.
255. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (“In enacting the APA,
Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed administrative
decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested persons
notice and an opportunity to comment.”).
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participation, deliberation, and transparency . . . guard against arbitrariness and foster
accountability.”256 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, the citizen petition provision,
and the mechanisms for judicial review provide ways to allow regulated entities and
beneficiaries access to the deliberative process and a means to challenge agency
determinations.
Transparency bolsters the legitimacy of agency decisions by, among other things,
reducing the appearance that the agency has been “captured” by special interests.
Administrative capture is a term for the phenomenon where regulated interests exert
such an influence over their regulators that they essentially control the agencies, at
the expense of the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory system.257 This
relationship can be explicit, where there is an actual flow of individuals between
industry and decision-making regulatory positions, or implicit, which involves more
attenuated but no less real connections between decision makers and industry.258 And
although regulatory beneficiaries may fear the synergy of agencies and their
regulated objects, the term “capture” also encompasses the possibility that a regulator
is so intertwined with the regulatory beneficiaries that it is no longer an effective
regulating body.259 To address capture, judicial review can provide a degree of
oversight that can root out and address unreasonable decision making affected by
political considerations.260

256. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 & n.18 (2013)
(collecting sources on administrative law values).
257. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2, 8 n.32 (2010);
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1590–91 (2007) (“Agencies may be able to secure
expanded budgets or even engage in outright favoritism to affected industry in exchange for
the usual rewards of regulatory capture—electoral support for the administration in power,
revolving doors from agencies to industry, and a reduced risk of embarrassment that might
result from more adversarial modes of regulatory exchange.”).
258. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006). The question of whether agency capture is
actually a problem, or more a perceived problem, and the effects thereof, has been amply
discussed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 183–84 (1992); see
also Bagley & Revesz, supra, at 1284–92 (arguing that the theory of regulatory capture does
not adequately explain the reality of governmental agency processes).
259. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 258, at 1286 (“[V]illains of this story are environmental
groups like the Sierra Club, labor unions like the Teamsters, and consumer advocacy groups
like Public Citizen, all of whom are driven by their narrow ideologies and heedless of any
costs to American industries. Through their superior organizational mettle, these ostensibly
‘public-serving’ groups prey on the sensibilities of warm-hearted but fuzzy-headed
bureaucrats and congressmen to drive through regulations that are unnecessary, unwise, or
simply too costly.”); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1279 (“[O]ld fears of factional
domination are now widely perceived to have been realized; broad legislative delegations have
left agencies vulnerable to the sustained and organized political pressure of regulated firms,
unions, and other powerful interest groups.”).
260. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 256, at 314 (“[T]he rigors of judicial scrutiny
can further democratic accountability and otherwise incentivize legitimizing behaviors.”).
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When the procedural mechanisms stop working smoothly, whether that happens
because the agency refuses to respond to a petition,261 abuses the “tentative response”
tool,262 or does not comply with a court order,263 public access to agency decision
making is truncated, and the opportunities for review are lessened. For example, after
calling for hearings on the withdrawal of approval for certain uses of certain
antibiotics in animal feed in 1977, FDA continued to hold meetings on the issue
through 1987.264 Between 1987 and 2003, however, when FDA proposed to
withdraw the notice for a hearing, it appears that no open meetings on the issue were
held although FDA was continuing to approve new subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics
in animal feed during those years.
C. The Lessened Value of Judicial Review
The benefits of the judicial review of agency action are manifold.265 As Hammond
and Markell note in their discussion of administrative legitimacy, “[a]t their core, the
various principles of judicial review reinforce administrative law values of
participation, deliberation, and transparency, which guard against arbitrariness and
foster accountability.”266 The courts can increase the legality of administrative
decision making by “ensur[ing] that regulatory agencies comply with congressional
commands” and can foster the legitimacy of outcomes by protecting against arbitrary
decisions and the excessive influence of interest groups.267 The judicial process itself
is focused and accessible.268 And even divorced from its effect on outcomes, the
participatory nature of judicial review is seen by some as “inherently valuable;
citizen involvement in community self-determination is desirable without regard to
notions of efficiency or private rights.”269
Ineffective private enforcement, however, diminishes these benefits in two ways.
First, if an agency can delay its response to a citizen petition, the issue does not reach
the courts for years, if at all. This is what happened in Natural Resources Defense
Council, the animal antibiotics case. Second, the lack of statutory tools that leads to

261. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (antibiotics in animal feed).
262. See, e.g., In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (suit to
compel response to petition calling for removal of BPA from food packaging).
263. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (FDA did not
rule on citizen petition calling for switch of emergency contraception to OTC status for almost
three years after court order to do so).
264. See Open Meeting Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,760 (Apr. 24, 1987) (calling for open
meeting for consumer participation to discuss antibiotics in animal feed); Open Meeting
Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,980 (Apr. 23, 1985) (calling for open meeting for consumer
participation to discuss antibiotics in animal feed).
265. Critics of judicial review have also noted its potential detriments. See supra note 13.
266. Hammond & Markell, supra note 256, at 316.
267. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522–25.
268. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1147,
1150–51 (2012).
269. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1279.
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ineffective private enforcement also contributes to increased judicial deference to the
agency, which can weaken some of the benefits of judicial review.
There are multiple reasons why a case of agency inaction may not reach the courts
for years, if at all. To begin with, there are high barriers to filing suit against an
agency, including the need for expertise in the subject matter covered by the agency,
knowledge of the regulatory process, and the resources to support prolonged
litigation.270 Even groups skilled at bringing agency-forcing suits have priorities and
agendas of their own, as well as a need to satisfy the diverse constituencies that make
up their membership and financial support structure.271
Once a party files a petition against an agency, it can bring a suit to challenge the
agency’s determination or the agency’s failure to respond.272 However, the question
of when a failure-to-respond suit is appropriate can be complicated by the filing of a
tentative response, which provides no substantive consideration of the issue and no
timeframe for disposition of the issue.273 For example, in the antibiotics in animal
feed case, petitioners filed citizen petitions in 1999 and 2005 and did not sue for a
response until 2011.274 In the emergency contraception case, petitioners filed their
first petition in 2001 and did not receive a denial until 2006.275 Petitioners in the raw
milk case first filed a petition in 1984, although the Agency had been delaying on the
issue of an interstate ban since 1973.276
When a case does come before a court, judicial deference may weaken the value
of judicial review by reducing the intensity with which the court scrutinizes agency
action.277 There is a tradition of strong judicial deference to FDA decisions,278 for

270. See William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen Enforcement, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 231–34 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
271. For example, in the 1980s, Public Citizen brought several suits against FDA regarding
food safety issues, but the organization no longer focuses on this type of litigation. See
Winters, supra note 203, at 908 n.16. The Center for Science in the Public Interest’s litigation
docket is currently focused on deceptive labeling litigation. See Litigation Project—Current
Docket, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT., http://www.cspinet.org/litigation/current.html.
272. See supra Part I.A.
273. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D.D.C. 1985) (raw milk case).
274. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
275. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
276. Public Citizen, 602 F. Supp. at 611–12. Even more recently than any of the above
listed examples, the Center for Science in the Public Interest submitted a petition to FDA in
February 2013 calling for the agency to further regulate the use of certain added sugars in
foods and beverages. Petition To Ensure the Safe Use of “Added Sugars,” Ctr. for Sci. in the
Pub. Interest (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/sugar_petition_2-12
-13_final.pdf. In the petition, the Center for Science in the Public Interest indicates that it
submitted a petition to FDA in 1999 calling for regulations on added sugars and a petition to
FDA in 2005 requesting warning notices on nondiet soft drinks regarding added sugars, and
received a response to neither. See id. at 3 n.4.
277. See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 737–38 (2011)
(“[S]uper deference . . . inhibits transparency; undermines deliberation; fails to accord with
political accountability; and generally abdicates the courts’ role in the constitutional scheme
by encouraging outcome-oriented review.”).
278. See CARPENTER, supra note 162, at 361; Laurie J. Beyranevand, Milking It:
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two reasons. First, because of the technical and scientific complexity of many FDA
determinations, courts tend to defer to FDA’s expertise in its regulatory space.279
Second, the FDCA itself, written at the turn of the twentieth century, lacks, in certain
areas, the clearly articulated congressional goals and statutory deadlines found in the
more modern environmental statutes.280 Courts are therefore left with few guideposts
by which to judge agency action.
V. SUPPLEMENTING THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE LITIGANTS SEEKING TO
COMPEL AGENCY ACTION
The previous Parts have shown that private enforcement has failed under certain
circumstances to ameliorate the problem of arbitrary decision making by FDA,
resulting in Agency inaction. In this Part, I propose several incremental changes that
will address this problem. First, Congress should amend the Act to include more
specific petition provisions, including mandatory response deadlines and
informational requirements to support judicial review. Second, the FDCA’s general
citizen petition provision should be strengthened. And third, I reiterate and
supplement the call made by Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore that
private parties be able to petition the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) for review of denials of petitions for rulemaking.281
A. Specific Petition Provisions
The inclusion of specific petition provisions in the FDCA would help prevent
Agency delay and give courts a basis on which to review Agency decision making,
or lack thereof. For example, public awareness of the connection between animal
drugs and human health has increased.282 If 21 U.S.C. § 360b, the provision of the
FDCA dealing with new animal drugs, contained a specific petition provision
regarding the withdrawal of an approved animal drug, it would be easier for private
parties to force movement on these issues. Section 360b creates a precise system for
applications for uses of new animal drugs, which include exact response deadlines

Reconsidering the FDA’s Refusal To Require Labeling of Dairy Products Produced from
RBST Treated Cows in Light of International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 23 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 102, 134 (2011) (“Commentators suggest that the age of deference to the FDA
is coming to an end . . . .”); James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939,
940 (2008) (discussing evolution of judicial deference to FDA).
279. See, e.g., Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer
Genomic Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475, 509–10 (2012)
(discussing judicial deference to FDA’s definition of “device”).
280. See supra Part II.E; see also Bressman, supra note 9, at 1688 (“Congress often writes
broad delegating statutes to create opportunities for narrow interests to dominate agency
decisionmaking. Congress similarly grants power without meaningful administrative limits so
that its members will have space to push agencies toward preferential outcomes.”).
281. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 174 (2008).
282. See, e.g., Ruth Reichl, Op-Ed., The F.D.A.’s Blatant Failure on Food, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2014, at A23.
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by FDA.283 It also discusses the withdrawal of approval, including on what such
withdrawal shall be based and how the Agency will go about withdrawing
approval.284 The statute does not, however, contain timeframes within which this
process must occur, nor a specific petition provision providing judicial review to a
petitioner. For this reason, a party moving to withdraw the approval of a new animal
drug will move through the mechanisms of the FDCA’s general citizen petition
provision and be subject to the weaknesses therein.
Congress could also incorporate a “statutory hammer” to make such a provision
more effective. Statutory hammers add a layer of consequence to a statutory deadline.
For example, some statutes provide a deadline before which an agency must act and
prescribe substantive standards that will go into effect if the deadline is not met.285
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act contained a different kind of hammer—it
required the Agency to establish proposed regulations within twelve months, which
became final if final regulations were not promulgated in the next twelve months.286
It is relatively easy to imagine how the increased use of statutory deadlines
coupled with hammers could improve the regulatory process where agency inaction
is caused by political pressure. Congress could amend the Animal Drug Amendments
to prescribe that if a use of an approved animal drug was shown to be a harmful
contaminant,287 hearings on its withdrawal would need to be held within twelve
months or the drug would be automatically banned from animal feed. Congress could
direct that once a group such as the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research finds
that the OTC sale of a drug would be safe and effective, a proposed regulation
switching the drug to OTC status must be written within twelve months, and a final
regulation issued within twenty-four months, unless new information is discovered
during the notice-and-comment period.
It is true that even when statutes are prescriptive, agency discretion remains. For
example, if FDA was directed to hold hearings if an animal drug were found to be
harmful to human health, the meaning of “harmful” would be contested. These
determinations involve policy as well as scientific judgment.288 Deadlines can also
improve timing at the expense of process.289 Nevertheless, the increased use of goal

283. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(b) (2012).
284. Id. § 360b(e).
285. M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 154 (1995).
Magill notes that the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
contain several of these devices. Id. at 154 n.19.
286. Id. at 150.
287. The showing necessary to trigger a hearing would have to be precisely articulated so as
to lessen the possibility of frivolous claims. For example, FDA only authorizes health claims
made if “there is significant scientific agreement, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate such claims”; this could be a model. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (2014).
288. Cf. Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 287 (1992)
(explaining how scientists must make many policy judgments in performing quantitative risk
assessment analysis on potential carcinogens).
289. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 926 (2008).
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statements and statutory deadlines would increase the incidence and effectiveness of
private party oversight over agency inaction.
B. Strengthening the Petition Provision of the FDCA
Under 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e), the FDA Commissioner has 180 days to approve,
deny, or furnish a “tentative response” to a citizen petition filed with the Agency.290
The tentative response must “indicat[e] why the agency has been unable to reach a
decision on the petition, e.g., because of the existence of other agency priorities, or
a need for additional information,” and “may also indicate the likely ultimate agency
response, and may specify when a final response may be furnished.”291
The tentative response provision should be eliminated, or altered to include a
deadline for the Agency to submit an approval or denial. The Agency should also be
required to inform the petitioning party when it plans to submit a final response.
Under the petition provision to bring a species within the purview of the ESA, the
relevant agency (either FWS or NMFS) has ninety days after a petition is submitted
to determine whether the petition contained such information as to suggest that
further review was warranted.292 If the agency does move forward with review, it
then has one year to decide whether to deny the petition, approve the petition, or
decide that the petition is warranted but that a regulation implementing the final
regulation cannot be promulgated immediately because of other pending proposals
to add species to the endangered or threatened lists.293 Significantly, the provision
states that if the agency finds that the petition should be granted but that a regulation
cannot be promulgated immediately, the petition “shall be treated as a petition that is
resubmitted to the Secretary . . . and that presents substantial scientific or commercial
information that the petitioned action may be warranted.”294 This means that the
twelve-month clock begins again, and a new deadline is placed on the agency to take
action. These deadlines are a useful tool and should be expanded within the FDCA.295
There are counterarguments to the increased use of statutory deadlines. In their
discussion of administrative deadlines, Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell
note the importance of such deadlines, explaining that because Congress is often
reluctant to impose substantive guidelines on agencies for reasons of agency
discretion and expertise, “the most obvious way of controlling agency behavior is to
regulate either the method or the timing of agency decision making.”296 However,
Gersen and O’Connell find that while deadlines “do quicken agency action, at least
to some degree,” they also “produce policy resulting from systematically different

290. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2014).
291. Id. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii).
292. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012).
293. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
294. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i).
295. It is important to note that the FDCA’s petition provision is in the form of a regulation,
which is promulgated by the Agency. The ESA’s provision is statutory. To hold the Agency
to a stricter response time, Congress may need to act.
296. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 289, at 926.
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decision-making processes that are less intensive than the norm. Deadlines seem to
trade timing against process, and possibly even quality.”297
However, deadlines placed on the agency would provide private parties an
important tool for compelling agency action. Parties are more likely to bring suit if a
deadline is breached, and courts are better able to adjudicate such suits than those
based on the merits.298 Because one of our concerns is that FDA has been able to
escape any judicial scrutiny of its inaction, stricter deadlines would at least assist in
bringing these issues before courts, which could then oversee the process.
C. Permitting Petitions to OIRA for the Review of the Denial of Rulemaking
In their book on the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis for the increased regulatory
protection of health, safety, and the environment, Revesz and Livermore call for OIRA
to take on an increased role in setting agency agendas.299 Revesz and Livermore believe
that a petitioner should be able to appeal to OIRA if her petition for rulemaking is
denied.300 If the petition is supported by credible cost-benefit analyses, “OIRA could then
examine the cost-benefit analysis, and if there is a strong enough case for regulation,
either mediate between the agency and the groups, or issue a finding of fact that the
regulation is justified.”301 This suggestion has merit, and could be strengthened by
permitting an appeal if the agency has issued a place-holding response, like FDA’s
“tentative response,” pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e).
OIRA was created in 1980 by the Paperwork Reduction Act,302 and the office was
initially occupied with reviewing agencies’ information collection requests.303 Under
President Reagan, however, the Office became, and remains, charged with the
centralized review of regulation. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,
which required agencies to prepare cost-benefit analyses for major rules and to send
a copy of each proposed or final rule to OIRA before publication.304 The goals of
centralized review during the Reagan era were twofold: (1) to coordinate the
regulatory state and promote efficiency and cost effectiveness, and (2) to cut down
on unnecessary (and overzealous) regulation.305 Critics have shown, however, that

297. Id. at 978. It is worth noting that in their empirical analysis, Gersen and O’Connell
note that the agencies that faced the most deadlines in their period of study (1987–2003) were
EPA, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Interior, the Department of
Transportation, USDA, and HHS. Id. at 939.
298. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency
Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1748–49 (2012).
299. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 281, at 173–74.
300. Id. at 174.
301. Id.
302. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)).
303. Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1259 (2006).
304. See id. at 1261.
305. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 258, at 1264.
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OIRA’s main focus during the Reagan years was deregulation, and that the
coordinating role of OIRA was deprioritized.306
President Clinton replaced Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,866,
which maintained the framework of executive review of regulatory decision making,
but increased transparency and introduced certain considerations in rulemaking
review that arguably reduced the body’s antiregulatory bias.307 President Obama
reinstated Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866, after changes made to the Office during
the administration of George W. Bush.308
President Clinton’s innovations notwithstanding, critics argue that OIRA review
is structured to be antiregulation.309 The Office is also criticized for its lack of
neutrality—“the available evidence supports the view that the mix of participants
active in the OIRA review process heavily favors industry”310—and for its political
motives.311 It may seem counterintuitive to utilize OIRA to goad agency action, as it
has often been viewed as antiregulatory by commentators. Indeed, as Sidney A.
Shapiro has noted, “we do know that OIRA often intervenes to weaken proposed
rules, and there is evidence that it almost always does so when it makes changes, at
least when the changes involve significant rules.”312
Nevertheless, OIRA is still situated in a unique position to coordinate and
rationalize agency action.313 Revesz and Livermore suggest certain reforms that
would improve OIRA’s ability to assist in calibrating agency action, and
coordinating interagency activity. These include increasing the transparency of
OIRA deliberation, shifting OIRA’s focus from curbing regulation to helping
agencies prioritize agenda items, and emphasizing OIRA as a harmonizing body.314
But even with no formal reform, reviewing denials of rulemaking petitions would
serve OIRA’s current goals, in that the costs of agency inaction can easily outweigh
the benefits and the goals of the agencies charged with protecting the health and
safety of the public.

306. See, e.g., id. at 1265.
307. See id. at 1266–67; Copeland, supra note 303, at 1271–72.
308. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
Q&A’s, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRA_QsandAs.
309. E.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 258, at 1267–68. Bagley and Revesz argue that
OIRA only reviews regulations to see if they are too stringent as opposed to too relaxed, that
OIRA rarely if ever reviews decisions to deregulate, and that agency inaction is not
scrutinized. These three factors bias the Office against regulation.
310. Id. at 1306.
311. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L.
1083, 1095 (2007) (arguing that the Office tried to impose additional scientific procedures on
agencies for the purpose of slowing down regulation, and that it tried “to bend the risk
assessment process away from the protective stance that Congress has required”).
312. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (2012).
313. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 281, at 183 (stating OIRA is well placed to
harmonize and coordinate agency functions given its original mission and present authority).
314. Id. at 171–83.
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CONCLUSION
Two recent, high-profile incidents have demonstrated the importance of—but
flaws in—the use of private party oversight to combat arbitrary inaction by FDA.
Private enforcement has proven to be a weak counter to agency inertia in these and
other circumstances, and it has been unable to avert the harm to the public health
caused by this inaction. The failure of private party oversight reduces the
transparency of agency decision making and diminishes the benefits of judicial
review on the administrative process.
By comparing private enforcement under the FDCA to more successful private
party activity under various environmental statutes, this Article shows that there are
several steps that Congress can take to address agency inaction by FDA. These steps
could help to restore the vitality of private party oversight, which is an integral part
of the administrative enforcement scheme and benefits the public health along with
the regulatory state.

